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Abstract
The debate between Fraser and Wallace (2011) over the foundations of
quantum field theory (QFT) has spawned increased focus on both the axiomatic
and conventional formalisms. The debate has set the tone for future foundational
analysis, and has forced philosophers to “pick a side”. The two are seen as
competing research programs, and the major divide between the two manifests in
how each handles renormalization. In this paper I argue that the terms set by the
Fraser-Wallace debate are misleading. AQFT and CQFT should be viewed as
complementary formalisms that start from the same physical basis. Further, the
focus on cutoffs as demarcating the two approaches is also highly misleading.
Though their methods differ, both axiomatic and conventional QFT seek to use the
same physical principles to explain the same domain of phenomena.
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1 Introduction
Foundational invesitgation into quantum field theory (QFT) has emerged as a flourishing
enterprise in philosophy of science, thanks largely to work done in axiomatic QFT
(AQFT), particularly the C∗-algebraic approach enocoded by the Haag-Kastler axioms
(Haag and Kastler 1964). Despite the methodological disconnect with ‘conventional’
approaches to QFT (CQFT), AQFT has been defended by Fraser (2009) as supplying a
firmer foundation from which to conduct philosophical analyses. Though this is one of
few explicit defenses of AQFT, the widespread use of algebraic methods in philosophical
literature on QFT would lead one to believe that Fraser is merely making explicit the
assumptions in her field. Recently, Wallace (2006; 2011) has questioned the focus on
AQFT, arguing that CQFT is the better candidate for analysis. Since CQFT is the
theory that has been emprically successful—the Standard Model of particle physics is
built from CQFTs—and AQFT has yet to reproduce these results, Wallace argues that
we should focus analysis on CQFT rather than AQFT. Fraser’s (2011) reply has set up
what is now known as the Fraser-Wallace debate over the foundations of QFT. The
debate has set the tone for future foundational analysis, and seems to force philosophers
to “pick a side”—you either work in AQFT or CQFT. The two are seen as competing
research programs, and the major divide between the two manifests in how each handles
renormalization. AQFT requires strict Poincare´ covariance at arbitrarily small length
scales, while the renormalization group (RG) methods in CQFT allow for a small-scale
cutoff, below which QFTs needn’t be well-defined.
In this paper I argue that the terms set by the Fraser-Wallace debate are misleading.
One needn’t view AQFT and CQFT as rival research programs; in fact, this view is
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detrimental to understanding the history and methodology of QFT. AQFT and CQFT
should be viewed as complementary formalisms that start from the same physical basis.
Further, the focus on cutoffs as demarcating the two approaches is also highly
misleading: AQFT can accommodate cutoffs and RG methods, and CQFT does not
explicitly require cutoffs. The focus on cutoffs as essential to CQFT could mistakenly be
taken to mean that CQFT depends on cutoffs actually being physical, in the same way
that cutoffs are physical in condensed matter physics (CMP). I will argue that this is not
the case: cutoffs needn’t be physical in any sense. Even if cutoffs are physically
significant, that does not entail that the cutoffs are themselves physical. Specifically, RG
methods provide no principled grounds for thinking that cutoffs are “real” in the sense of
signifying a breakdown of field theories generally. Since Wallace (2011) set the terms of
the debate, the bulk of the arguments in this paper will be in reference to that paper. I
do not claim that Wallace holds all (or even most) of the views against which I argue;
rather, I use his paper to clarify potential misconceptions that could arise from the
debate. Renormalization is not central to the physical content of QFT, and the different
ways of handling renormalization do not mark AQFT and CQFT as different research
programs. We should instead view the formalisms as complementary: though their
methods differ, both seek to use the same physical principles to explain the same domain
of phenomena.
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2 Renormalization and the relationship between AQFT and
CQFT
Wallace (2011) emphasizes the ineliminable dependence on cutoffs in CQFT, along with
the success of RG methods for providing a physical motivation for cutoffs, as the wedge
which drives AQFT and CQFT apart. For Wallace, AQFT cannot deal with physical
cutoffs. Since RG methods have physically legitimized cutoffs, AQFT and CQFT have
differing physical content and must therefore be considered a different research program
(2011, Sec. 2). I disagree with this characterization on two fronts. First, AQFT has the
resources to incorporate RG methods when needed. Though typical axioms make no
metion of scaling behaviour, even the most rigid of axiomatic approaches—algebraic
QFT as codified in the Haag-Kastler axioms—can incorporate something like RG flows.1
Second, the calculational dependence on cutoffs in CQFT may not signal the physical
existence of cutoffs.
So, are cutoffs really that problematic for AQFT? Many axiomatic approaches to QFT
make no recourse to cutoffs, either explicitly or implicitly. An explicit forbidding of
cutoffs would mean that one of the axioms/postulates of the theory claimed that the
theory is empirically adequate at all spacetime length scales. Even if any axiomatization
contained such an axiom (none do), it would be hard to imagine what sort of work it
would do in derivations. Presumably, such a system could be modified to remove the
guilty axiom, without spoiling any physically useful theorems. One should therefore not
be concerned with an explicit ban on cutoffs in AQFT.
The more interesting case is when cutoffs are implicitly rejected by a particular theory.
1See Buchholz and Verch (1995) for an example of scaling algebras playing the role of RG flows.
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There are two common assumptions in AQFT that are problematic for handling cutoffs:
strongly continuous implementations of Lorentz invariance, and the association of
algebras with arbitrarily small open bounded regions of spacetime. Though the latter is
not common to all axiomatic QFTs (the Wightman axioms deal directly with quantum
fields, rather than algebras), the dominant axiomatization in terms of C∗ algebras—the
Haag-Kastler axioms—define QFTs in terms of algebras of observables corresponding to
open, bounded regions of spacetime.2 It is implicit that for any open bounded spacetime
region, no matter how small, one can define an algebra of observables satisfying the other
axioms defining QFT. If cutoffs are physical, one might conclude that there should be a
principled limit to the size of regions on which we can define algebras corresponding to
observables in QFT. If the cutoff scale is physically relevant, and only CQFT predicts its
existence, we might be tempted to conclude that the two are different, competing
theories. However, there are several possibilities for reconciling AQFT and cutoffs, which
I will outline below. These remedies are largely independent of one another, and
organized in terms of increasing foundational disagreement with Wallace’s view of
cutoffs. The “quick fixes” proposed first lead to further conceptual worries, and I
therefore endorse the option in Sec. 2.3, which is the biggest departure from taking
cutoffs as physical in CQFT. Nevertheless, all the options sketched below are
more-or-less viable. Section 2.4 outlines reasons for thinking that both AQFT and CQFT
suffer the same conceptual challenges if cutoffs really are physical.
2Since algebraic QFT is prima facie the most problematic, I will deal primarily with algebraic QFT in
this paper. The reader can take AQFT to stand for axiomatic QFT or algebraic QFT for the remainder
of this paper. The reader should also note that constructive QFT is another important strand of rigorous
QFT. Though it is conceptually distinct from AQFT, the two projects often overlap.
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2.1 Possibilities for cutoffs in AQFT
Just because we need to associate an algebra with any arbitrary open bounded region of
spacetime, we are not therefore compelled to make this algebra interesting. One way
that cutoffs could be introduced into AQFT is to specify that regions smaller than some
4-volume Λ are to be uniformly assigned trivial algebras, i.e., algebras containing only
multiples of the identity. Such assignments would be consistent with the demand that all
open bounded regions of spacetime be assigned an algebra, but it would make the cutoff
physically relevant, since no information about local parameters would be contained in
regions smaller than Λ.
Though this solution is available, it is admittedly somewhat ad hoc. Even worse, it
violates one of the crucial Haag-Kastler axioms: that of weak additivity. The axiom of
weak additivity states that, for every closed, bounded region O of Minkowski spacetime
M, the C∗ norm closure of the algebras A(O + α) for α ∈ R4 is just the quasilocal
algebra for the whole spacetime, A(M).3 There are two reasons why this is a problem
for introducing cutoffs in the way described above. First, we run into the problem that
the quasilocal algebra corresponding to the whole of M can be constructed from any
algebra corresponding to any closed, bounded region O. The norm closure of extensions
of a trivial algebra will not produce any interesting algebra as a result, so regions smaller
than the cutoff Λ will violate weak additivity. Second, extensions of an arbitrary region
O by some α < Λ should not be physical if Minkowski spacetime breaks down at scales
below Λ. In the spirit of the first ad hoc axiom modification, weak additivity could be
modified to exclude regions Osmall < Λ, and arbitrary extensions αsmall < Λ. However,
3See Ruetsche (2011), especially chapters 4 and 5 for an introduction to algebraic QFT. For a more
comprehensive review of algebraic QFT, see Halvorson and Mu¨ger (2007).
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there seems to be no principled reason for choosing a specific value of Λ, and one may
question the naturalness of such axioms. This makes the solution of simple axiom
modification less tempting, and forces us to admit that AQFT—at least in its current
guise—is in conflict with approaches to QFT that take cutoffs as physically meaningful,
since the basic axioms are currently in direct conflict with the introduction of cutoffs. If
we admit that there is currently no room in the formalism of AQFT for cutoffs, are we
doomed to take AQFT as (incorrectly) positing its own validity at all energy scales?
2.2 No cutoffs? No problem
If QFT methods are only applicable up to some cutoff energy, and we expect QFT to
incorporate this fact, we are saying that a good theory should signal its own demise. The
formal necessity of cutoffs in the formalism of CQFT has lead to the idea that our best
theories will continue to be an increasing hierarchy of effective field theories. Each field
theory requires cutoffs to be implemented at a certain energy scale, and this signals the
field theory’s domain of applicability. If supplanted by a successor field theory, one
expects that the new theory’s low energy regime reduces to the old theory, and further
that the new theory will itself have a higher energy cutoff. Following this approach, the
conventional formalism of field theories would allow us to climb higher and higher up the
ladder of energy scales, but we would never reach the top. We would require a theory of
a fundamentally different formal type in order to end the ladder of cutoffs. This is
presumably the view that Wallace holds, as he claims that if we replace one field theory
with another applicable at higher energies, “that field theory in turn will need some kind
of short-distance cutoff” (2011, p. 118).
As great as it may be to have a framework in which theories limit their own domain of
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applicability, this is certainly not a necessary condition that any good formalism need
satisfy. Even if AQFT does not contain cutoffs explicitly, this does not make it at odds
with CQFT. Many theories that have been useful in the past do not signal their ultimate
demise; on the contrary, most are mathematically well-defined well beyond their domain
of applicability. For example, classical theories of fluid dynamics treat fluids as classical
continua, and these continua are uniform to arbitrary precision. Classical continuum
fluid dynamics is a useful theory, and compatible with classical point mechanics, even
though classical point mechanics leads one to believe that the continuum is only an
approximation—at some point fluid dynamics must break down. There is nothing within
the formalism of fluid mechanics that signals its eventual breakdown; rather, the physical
systems we model using classical fluid dynamics, as well as the complementary formalism
of classical point particles, give us a physical motivation for the eventual breakdown of
the formalism. Deeper theories, such as quantum mechanics, also provide grounds for
believing in the limited applicability of both of the complementary classical formalisms.
Similarly, we can view AQFT as a complementary picture to the formalism of CQFT.
Both formalisms rely on the same general physical principles, though they are
implemented in different ways. Though the AQFT formalism does not demarcate its
domain of applicability in the form of explicit cutoffs, the necessity of some form of
cutoff in CQFT provides reason to believe that the AQFT formalism is only
approximately mapping the actual physics. Further, whatever extratheoretical grounds
we have for taking cutoffs to be physical—typically in the guise of speculative physics
beyond the Standard Model—can inform the scale at which we lose faith in the
predictions of both the AQFT and CQFT formalisms. When one does not view AQFT
and CQFT as rival research programs, the two can work together to provide a deeper
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physical understanding of high energy physics, and the role of cutoffs is made clearer.
2.3 Physical significance versus being physical
Are cutoffs really that central? The arguments in the previous section assume that the
cutoffs required to generate predictions in CQFT are physical, in the sense that they
signal a breakdown of QFT. The fact that perturbative calculations within a particular
model diverge when the integrals are unbounded does not entail that field theoretic
methodology loses physical significance near these bounds. Undoubtedly we have
extratheoretical reasons for supposing that the QFTs making up the Standard Model are
not accurate to arbitrary energies—at some point gravity will surely play an important
role, to say nothing for possible unknown physics at higher energy scales—but this
needn’t signify a breakdown of QFTs in general beyond a cutoff. Nor is this notion built
in to the conceptual apparatus of RG methods, as Wallace claims.4 It remains entirely
possible that a QFT built with more terms in its Lagrangian could describe all relevant
physics and be well-defined at all energy scales. In fact, the renormalization group
procedure presupposes a theory given in terms of a Lagrangian or Hamiltonian with an
arbitrary number of terms. These terms are shown to go to zero in the low energy limit
(Wilson and Kogut 1974). We know—using the RG methods to determine the flow of
coupling constants—that for non-Abelian gauge theories, interactions become weaker at
higher energy scales. Total asymptotic freedom would be one way to eliminate cutoffs at
4“Wilsons explanation of the renormalisation procedure relies upon the failure of the QFT to which it
is applied at very short distances. It is then intriguing to ask how to put on a firm conceptual footing
a theory which relies for its mathematical consistency on its own eventual failure”. (Wallace 2006, 34,
emphasis added) Again, this passage can be read in a way that agrees with the arguments of this section.
I am attempting to argue against a naive reading, which takes the failure of one QFT (i.e., a single form
of interaction, encoded in a particular Lagrangian) to signal the failure of QFT methods in general.
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high energies. A successor QFT, such as a grand unified theory or supersymmetry, could
therefore unite the strong and electroweak coupling constants, while remaining
well-defined to arbitrarily high energies.5 All that RG methods rely on conceptually is
the ability to average out behaviour at high energy scales, and this is compatible with
many options for high-energy behaviour. First, our theories could be low-energy
approximations that break down at higher energy scales. This could be due to a
fundamental granularity or discreteness in the more fundamental theory, or due to the
absence of terms in the Lagrangian modelling high energy dynamics. Second, we could
have a well-defined high energy dynamics that is unimportant at the energy scales with
which we are concerned. In any case, RG methods provide no principled grounds for
thinking that cutoffs are “real” in the sense of signifying a breakdown of field theories
generally. Unlike the breakdown of classical fluid mechanics—for which we have a more
fundamental successor theory (quantum mechanics) providing grounds to reject the
continuum as merely an approximation—there is as of yet no (empirically successful)
fundamental successor theory for which QFT can be considered a continuum
approximation.
One of the major reasons for thinking that cutoffs in QFT mark a regime beyond which
the methods of QFT can no longer be applied is the success of RG methods originating
from CMP (Wallace 2011, Sec. 1). RG methods were initially developed to investigate
long range correlations in materials approaching a phase transition. Long range
interactions are those most relevant to global transitions of a material, and so RG
5Whether a theory can be made well defined for arbitrarily high energies is a distinct issue from the
accuracy of that theory’s predictions at high energies. It may turn out that Standard Model QFTs can
be extended in a consistent way, but that the high energy predictions turn out to be false. This is the
case that is argued in Section 2.2 regarding AQFT.
10
methods average out the unimportant short range behaviour near a critical point. The
apparatus of non-relativistic QFT (i.e., functional integrals using Galilean invariant
Lagrangians) is used in CMP as an approximation to the discrete atomic (or ionic)
physical makeup of bulk systems. Given the the CMP field theories are explicitly
constructed as approximations to a known underlying lattice model, we know that the
field theoretic methods must break down within CMP. RG flow equations are derived by
separating field variables ϕ into low- and high-momentum components ϕ = ϕlow + ϕhigh
(where the cutoff from low to high is chosen arbitrarily) and averaging over the high
momentum modes. The resulting Lagrangian L′(ϕlow) is then manipulated to fall into
the same form as the original Lagrangian L(ϕ). This process is repeated and generates
discrete recursive relations between the rescaled coupling parameters in the (n+ 1)th
Lagrangian in terms of the nth one. In the limit where the rescalings are continuous,
these become differential equations determining the flow of coupling constants under RG.
As the flows are taken to zero frequency—equivalent to the infinite spatial limit—only
those parameters relevant to phase transitions will remain in the renormalized
Lagrangian. One of the most qualitatively interesting features of successively averaging
out short distance (and therefore high energy) degrees of freedom is that, no matter how
complicated the initial field dynamics are (encoded as a Lagrangian), only the
renormalizable terms will contribute to the low energy dynamics of the theory. This
implies that a very broad class of higher energy Lagrangians can “reduce” to the relevant
dynamics at lower energy scales.
The success of RG methods in CMP lead to their quick application in QFTs (Wilson
1983)6, since the relevant formalism is shared between the two disciplines. If we choose
6Wilson even forms the QFT/statistical mechanics analogy explicitly, though the source analog in that
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to endow the RG methods with similar physical significance in QFT, then we can
interpret the high energy cutoffs required as marking the domain at which we expect
new physics to occur. The problem is that, because RG flows tell us that our low-energy
(effective) QFTs are largely insensitive to the dynamical details at higher energies, they
provide little insight our guidance into the high energy physics. Though the path to the
successor theory isnt apparent given our current QFTs, the up side is that our best
QFTs are protected from the details of our ignorance of high energy dynamics.
Where Wallace might be read to err is in the jump from believing that cutoffs have
physical relevance in QFTs to believing that cutoffs are physical :
“This, in essence, is how modern particle physics deals with the
renormalization problem: it is taken to presage an ultimate failure of
quantum field theory at some short lengthscale, and once the bare existence
of that failure is appreciated, the whole of renormalization theory becomes
unproblematic, and indeed predictively powerful in its own right” (Wallace
2011, p. 119).7
The difference is subtle. Cutoffs can be physically relevant in that they signal the
breakdown of the particular theory or model beyond a certain energy scale, but whether
cutoffs themselves are physical depends on the precise nature of the breakdown. If the
case is a classical Ising model (Wilson and Kogut 1974). Fraser (2016) has provided an in-depth analysis
of the elements of the analogies between QFT and the Ising model, as well as the process of describing
RG flow.
7Or at least this is a jump he is sometimes guilty of. In other places he is more careful to elaborate
on this view, and it appears that he at least appreciates the fact that field theoretic methods may not
break down at all (Wallace 2006, pp. 43-4). As mentioned in the introduction, this paper is not a critique
of Wallace’s view explicitly, but of the misleading way of framing AQFT and CQFT as rivals based on
their differing treatments of the arbitrarily small; for this reason I aim to clarify the mistakes in a “naive”
reading of Wallace.
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breakdown can be remedied by adding new terms in the Lagrangian—effectively
changing the particular theory, but retaining the field theoretic framework—then the
cutoffs signal new physics, but are not themselves physical. If the breakdown is due to
the inapplicability of field theoretic methodology beyond that scale, then the cutoffs are
themselves physical.8 Even if one takes the cutoffs to have physical significance, cutoffs
needn’t be physical in this stronger sense.
One possible reason for thinking that cutoffs are physical is based off of reading too
much into the analogy with CMP. We know that field theoretic methods are
approximations in bulk matter systems—the atomic theory implies that macroscopic
matter is composed of discrete components. The analogy between QFT and CMP is
based on the use of the same field theoretic formalism in both disciplines, not on a
well-grounded physical similarity.9 Cutoffs are physical in CMP field theory because field
theoretic methods have been introduced as an approximation. Given that discrete
quantum mechanics of 1023 particles is intractable, we sacrifice (a surprisingly small
amount of) precision in order to apply the more soluble methods developed in QFT. But
the fact that cutoffs signal the breakdown of field approximations in CMP does not
imply that the same is true in QFT. The reasons we treat cutoffs as physical in CMP are
absent in QFT; there is no empirically successful theory that claims QFT breaks down
due to an underlying discreteness of physics near cutoff scales. Speculative physics may
posit some underlying structure for which quantum fields are merely an approximation,
8Presumably, the failure of field theoretic methodology in general would require some physical granu-
larity at high energies. This is what I mean by the cutoff being physical and is in direct analogy with the
case of non-relativistic QFT in CMP.
9Fraser (2016) and Fraser and Koberinski (2016) provide two concrete examples of fruitful formal
analogies between QFT and CMP. In the former case, it is the RG flow that is formally analogous,
while the latter deals with the formal similarities between spontaneous symmetry breaking within the two
theories.
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but until any of these theories make successful empirical predictions their significance for
interpreting QFTs must be limited.
2.4 Why physical cutoffs are also a problem for CQFT
Even though, as I have argued, there is currently no physically motivated reason for
supposing cutoffs to be physical, it may be the case that we find such a reason in the
future. Perhaps we will need radically different methods from those of field theory to
describe physics beyond the Standard Model. There is no shortage of candidates that
claim to radically alter our picture of the world—from 11-dimensional string theory to
discrete spacetime to the emergent spacetime of loop quantum gravity. Though
experimental support for any of these speculative theories would mean that the axioms
of any AQFT must be at best only approximations, this does not mean that CQFT
would escape unscathed. Any observed violation of Lorentz invariance would signal bad
news for both AQFT and CQFT, and the extent to which we choose to reject or salvage
the former, we should do the same for the latter.
Though its importance is not encoded in a set of axioms, Poincare´ invariance is of
central importance to the physical content of CQFT. In constructing QFTs, one starts
by writing down a classical Lagrangian to encode the physical content of the theory. The
two major constraints on the form of candidate Lagrangians are renormalizability (dealt
with above) and Poincare´ invariance. Since the Lagrangian is a scalar, it must remain
strictly invariant under the action of the Poincare´ group on its component fields. All of
the fundamental forces—as described by the Standard Model—are encoded in
Lagrangians obeying strict Poincare´ invariance. If anything qualifies as physically
relevant to CQFT, the Lagrangian certainly does; it is the starting point for building a
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QFT, and determines the types of fields, their masses, and the particulars of their
interactions. A violation of Poincare´ invariance at a more fundamental level—be it in a
particular physical process or in the structure of some new spacetime picture—undercuts
to the same extent the physical significance of any and all theories that depend on
Poincare´ invariance for their formulation. Thus, despite the lack of rigid and precise
axioms demanding Poincare´ invariance, the physical content of CQFT stands or falls
with AQFT.10
Once again, the major difference between AQFT and CQFT lies in the formalism.
Though the physical content of CQFT is built upon Poincare´ invariance11, the formalism
is indifferent to the constraints placed upon the Lagrangian. The success of field
theoretic methods in CMP is evidence of the flexibility of the formalism; in CMP the
Galilean group is taken as the appropriate symmetry group, given the low energies dealt
with. In contrast, the formalisms of various AQFTs are constructed around the axioms.
Any theorems that rely on exact Poincare´ invariance will only hold in the real world if
nature is Poincare´ invariant.12 The greater precision of the formalism in AQFT makes it
more rigid in this regard.
If violations of Poincare´ invariance are problematic for all variants of QFT, should
investigators into the foundations of QFT fret if such violations are experimentally
10CQFT methods could still be useful, but the theoretical framework of CQFT—as encoded in the
Standard Model—depends on Poincare´ invariance.
11Depending on how one views Poincare´ invariance, this may seem odd. The specific transformation
properties of scalars, vectors, and tensors under the Poincare´ group are undoubtedly formal properties
of the particular field representations. However, the physical symmetries represented in this way have a
physical basis (e.g., rotation invariance implies that the physical system can be modelled the same way
when rotated).
12Though it isn’t always possible, proofs of the form “If Minkowski spacetime then x” are strengthened
and made more robust by also showing “If approximately Minkowski spacetime then approximately x.
Given that our best current theories lead us to believe that spacetime is only locally Minkowski, these are
the results for which we can have a high degree of confidence in their robustness.
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confirmed? No; the experimental success of QFT implies that the world is at least
approximately Poincare´ invariant, and any evidence revealing the limits of that
approximation has no bearing on the theory itself. We have good reason to believe that
the QFTs in the Standard Model are not the final story: General Relativity implies that
strong gravitational effects distort spacetime, and that our spacetime is only ever
Minkowski in small patches where gravity is negligible. Though this approximation
seems to hold for experiments at the LHC, if we want a theory that gets spacetime
symmetries exactly correct, QFTs relying on Poincare´ invariance will not do the trick.
Rather than abandoning foundations of QFT for being approximate at best,
investigation should proceed given that QFTs are highly successful within the energy
domain currently testable. To this extent, we are justified in viewing the world as
approximately described by QFTs, and should content ourselves with investigating an
incomplete (though highly accurate) picture of nature. Whether we are dealing with a
formalism that encodes Poincare´ invariance into its axiomatic framework, or a formalism
in which Poincare´ invariance has been used indirectly to construct empirically successful
theories, we should not take violations of Poincare´ invariance as signalling the failure of
either approach. Any robust results obtained within either formalism will still hold
approximately, and should be equally subject to foundational analysis.
3 Conclusions
I have tried to show that cutoffs do not provide physical grounds for separating AQFT
and CQFT as rival research programs. First, RG methods can be incorporated into
AQFT without major issue, and cutoffs can be introduced as well—though explicit
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cutoffs provide a more pressing conceptual revision to AQFT. Second, we needn’t take
AQFT to be an exact description of the world. In the same way that classical fluid
dynamics is compatible with classical point mechanics, AQFT defined to arbitrary
precision can be compatible with a CQFT that requires cutoffs. The apropriate lesson is
that we should take AQFT to be approximately true in sufficiently low energy domains.
Finally, even if cutoffs are of physical significance, they don’t require a breakdown of
continuum methods in general. This idea stems from pushing an analogy with CMP,
which appears to be unjustified.
Though the Fraser-Wallace debate has spawned increased investigations into the
foundations of QFT, it has set the boundaries of the debate in such a way as to create a
false dichotomy: one is forced to choose whether to immerse oneself in the AQFT or
CQFT formalisms. When we discard the false dichotomy and recognize AQFT as
complementary to CQFT, we open the door to the synthesis of axiomatic methods with
Lagrangian QFT. In this way the general features of QFTs can be investigated rigorously
in AQFT, and we can be confident that—insofar as the axioms of AQFT capture the
physical assumptions of CQFT—the results carry over to CQFT.
Though it is true that there do not yet exist AQFT models that incorporate interactions
in four-dimensional spacetime, the successes of AQFT have been compatible with
CQFT. Free field theories and φ42 interaction theories constructed in AQFT give
predictions in agreement with comparable CQFTs. Insofar as AQFT is a successful
formalism, its results should be thought of as complementary to those of CQFT: one
uses the same physical principles to construct differing formalisms.
In essence, I advocate for a position similar to Wallace’s earlier view (though note that
in this passage he refers only to specific results of AQFT, such as the spin-statistics
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theorem):
the foundational results which have emerged from AQFT have been of
considerable importance in understanding QFT and in general they apply
also to Lagrangian QFTs. This paper should be read as complementary to,
rather than in competition with, these results (2006, p. 35).
The particular choice of formalism will depend on the scope of the foundational
investigation. If the goal is to prove general results applicable to any relativistic QFT,
then AQFT is the appropriate formalism; if the goal is to determine the consequences of
specific physical interactions, then CQFT should be used.
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